De Kadt, Daniel, and Horacio A. Larreguy. "Agents of the regime? Traditional leaders and electoral politics in South Africa." The Journal of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018):382-399.

Traditional leaders perform cultural, legal, economic and social roles. Some scholars argue that chiefs use their authority to provide votes to the highest bidder. Thus, chiefs indirectly influence electoral behavior of their dependents. Other scholars argue that chiefs have the incentive to support any politician who would guarantee their survival and bring resources to their local communities. DeKadt and Larreguy argue that chiefs are generally strategic actors who would align themselves with political parties that will best serve their interests only when they (chiefs) feel the politicians are electorally credible. Chiefs would rather trade off votes of their dependents with incumbent elites who have better access to resources than opposition parties who do not. They do this to ensure developmental outcomes for their dependents because their legal legitimacy and economic security has been weakened due to modern democracy. DeKadt and Larreguy further argue that as South Africa switched from apartheid to democratic regime, so did chiefs switch from being agents of apartheid to agents of the ANC government. The authors term this relationship between the traditional authority and political elites as ‘political quid pro quo’’.

‍